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Abstract  
In Europe, as in the rest of industrialized countries, reforms of the labour 
market have generally concerned employment protection legislation (EPL). One 
of the main missions of this legislation is to insure security for workers, 
particularly in case of redundancy. The object of this article is to compare the 
strictness and the degree of rigidity of EPL in two different economies, namely, 
Canada and France. This choice is justified by the fact that the labour market 
policies in both countries do not have the same orientation and are based on 
different ideological references. 
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1. Introduction 
In Europe, as in the rest of industrialized countries, the reforms of the 
labour market have generally concerned employment protection legislation 
(EPL). One of the main missions of this legislation is to insure the security of 
workers, particularly in case of redundancy (Cazes and Tonin 2010). Nevertheless, 
the notion of security covers other dimensions, such as the possibility of reinstating 
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easily and quickly finding a new job and security of income for those who 
participate in the labour market (Coxkx and Van Der Linden 2010). 
Several theoretical studies have attempted to analyze the effects of 
employment protection policies, including firing costs on firms’ performance. In 
this sense, Nickell (1978), Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1990) show 
that high dismissal compensation costs for firms reduces both the creation and 
elimination of jobs (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000, Mortensen and Pissarides 1999). 
In addition, in most Western countries we see the emergence and development 
of atypical forms of employment, associated with the need for professional security 
compatible with the constraints on flexibility required by companies. In this context, 
the concept of flexisecurity has become one of the political strategies to adjust 
employment regulations in response to the transformations of the labour market 
structure (Bevort and al. 2006). 
Unlike other public policies, this approach focuses on the protection of 
individuals rather than job protection. According to the European Commission, 
flexisecurity should answer the question of “how to maintain and improve 
competitiveness while strengthening the existing social model.” This concept was 
introduced for the first time in a publication of the Danish Ministry of Labour in 
1999, in which the "golden triangle" was described as an approach that combines the 
flexibility of the labour market (low firing costs), generous unemployment 
compensation, and active employment policies (executive education system). 
However, in the context of the economic crisis which accentuated the unemployment 
rate, the Danish government, which seeks to control its public spending, has 
established a set of reforms to favour the dynamics of the labour market. Among these 
reforms, the government introduced amendments to the unemployment insurance 
system by reducing the duration of unemployment benefits from four to two years. 
This questioning of flexisecurity is part of a process of developing a new concept, 
called mobication. According Meilland (2010), the concept of mobication is  
a contraction of the words mobility and education. This new approach is based on 
the development of human capital in order to increase mobility in the labour market 
by directing labour to those industries in short supply of it. 
In the same framework, Romih and Festić (2008) discussed the relevance of 
reforms such as flexisecurity in the economies of Central and Eastern Europe. They 
emphasized that it is necessary to review the relevance of individual forms of labour 
market flexibility and security while taking into account the competitiveness of the 
economy and social security of workers. Moreover, they explained that the 
successful implementation of flexisecurity requires consideration of several 
parameters, such as ethics, local values and social traditions. In this perspective, they 
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point out that the adoption of certainlexisecurity reforms in economies where 
legislation is weak could lead to negative effects on social security for workers and 
inefficient public spending increases (Kluwe and al. 1999). 
Boeri and Garibaldi (2005) show that in the case of Poland, for example, 
the transition difficulties between the public and private sectors explain the low 
employment rate of unemployed persons. In response, Poland and Slovenia each 
offered a program of public works in order to create opportunities for full-time 
employment for the unemployed. It should be noted that the low professional 
and spatial mobility of workers in Poland can partly be explained by the increase 
in the number of unemployed (Boeri and Garibaldi 2005). 
In a general way, EPL represents all the regulatory measures which govern 
the termination of employment, severance pay, periods of advance notice and 
other procedural obligations (Cazes and Tonin 2010). In this perspective, Botero 
and al. (2004), being interested in the determinants of the employment regulations, 
show that the latter are not of an economic, but legal nature. The legal system 
includes, according to these authors, three branches: labour law, the law of the 
collective relations, and the law of social security. 
In this sense, the World Bank, in terms of labour law, maintains three 
basic indicators. They concern the flexibility of recruitment, the flexibility of 
redundancy, and the conditions of employment. Besides, the OECD had developed 
indicators of the degree of job protection. These indicators measure the procedures 
and the costs related to redundancies of workers, and the procedures for hiring 
workers under fixed-term or temporary contracts. In the compilation of its data, 
the OECD takes into account the existing legislation, the collective (bargaining) 
agreements, and the jurisprudence of member countries.  
The object of this article is to compare the EPL in two different economies, 
namely, Canada and France. This choice is justified by the fact that the 
characteristics concerning and public policies underlying the labour markets of 
both countries are different. Indeed, the ‘common law’ countries (the United 
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom) appear as having 
weak regulation of employment with respect to the other countries of Western 
Europe (Netherlands, Germany, Italy, France, Greece, Spain, Portugal) (Kirat 2006). 
Tonin (2009) presented a study of employment protection legislation 
indicators for a wide group of Central and East European countries during recent 
years. Using the OECD methodology (OECD 1999), they took into account 
labour legislation and information from collective agreements. However, 
because of the difficulties in collecting and processing data for all countries, 
only the regulations contained in Labour Codes and other relevant laws were 
included in their study (for Poland the chosen law was that of 31 December 
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2004). They showed that in the countries studied informal practices (such as 
employment without a contract) were widespread and skewed the appreciation 
strictness of regulations on employment protection. As a result they explained 
that the inclusion of these informal practices in the indicators of EPL is a very 
difficult task owing to the lack of detailed information. 
In another study on labour markets in the economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, Nesporova Cazes (2003) emphasized the importance of adopting an update 
of EPL strictness in this region. 
According to Boulhol (2014), Poland is close to the OECD average in terms 
of EPL stringency for permanent contracts. In this context the author shows that 
regulation related to the definition of unfair dismissal is also one of the least 
constraining among OECD countries (OECD 2013). Furthermore, he explains that 
the Polish labour market is heavily segmented; the share of temporary employment 
in total dependent employment is above 25% (Baranowska and al. 2011). 
Taking this into account, Blanchard and Tirole (2003) examined the 
empirical relationship between employment protection and unemployment in the 
context of an international comparison. They showed that differences in 
employment protection between the United States (lower) and Portugal (higher) 
are not reflected in significant differences in unemployment rates in the two 
countries. Instead, over the past thirty years, their unemployment rates have been 
very similar. However, according to them, the duration of unemployment in 
Portugal was on average three times higher than in the United States (Blanchard 
and Portugal, 2001). 
We know that measuring employment protection is a difficult task, not only 
because of the variety of institutions, but in addition the indicator methodologies 
differ between countries, thus making comparisons difficult (Bertola and al. 2000). 
Therefore, especially given that Canada and France are both members of the OECD, 
the comparative analysis of the strictness of legislation between the two countries 
will be based on the indices and indicators defined by the OECD. 
2. Analysis and indicators for comparative purposes 
The OECD uses measurements to calculate its indication of employment 
protection which make reference to the employment protection conferred by the law 
and the regulations, taking into account the procedures of application. In general, the 
indicators used by the OECD refer to legislative and contractual elements.  
It is important to note that the work of Lazear (1990) was at the origin of 
several empirical studies on the effects of employment protection on the 
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performance of the labour market (Elmeskov and al 1998, Di Tella and 
MacCulloch 2005, Scarpetta 1996). In this perspective, and having as its main 
objective the development of a synthetic index of EPL, the OECD is much 
inspired by the work of Grubb and Wells (1993) (OECD, 1993, 1994, 1999). It 
considers that the measures developed by the OECD remain the most relevant and 
represent a great improvement over other analyzes based largely on firing costs 
(Addison and Teixeira 2003). 
In our case, we arranged the raw data concerning Canada and France into 
four components, and converted the components examined into cardinal values 
on a scale from 0 to 6, with 6 indicating the strictest legislation. The four 
components we used are those established by the OECD (2013). They are: the 
protection of the permanent workers against individual and collective dismissals 
(EPRC); the protection of the permanent workers against the individual 
dismissals (EPR); the additional rules applicable to collective dismissals (EPC); 
and the legislation concerning temporary contracts (EPT). 
The results of this data compilation are shown in Figure 1. It thus appears 
that laws and regulations related to EPL are more severe and rigid in the French 
economy compared to its Canadian equivalent. This is true for both permanent 
contracts as well temporary jobs. However, the difference is more significant 
when it comes to the comparison of temporary jobs (EPT). Indeed, this 
difference illustrates the rigid and conservative nature of French public policy, 
which emphasises the protection of workers and the fight against social 
exclusion at the expense of the flexibility required by companies to adjust their 
payroll to the vagaries of the economy. We later show that this severity has negative 
effects on the persistence of unemployment and on labour market participation. 
While the OECD associates EPL with the internalization effect of the 
social costs of dismissal by companies themselves in order to increase economic 
efficiency, other authors, in contrast, consider EPL to be a device for alternative 
taxation to employment regulation (Blanchard and Tirole, 2003, Cahuc and 
Kramarz, 2003, Cahuc and Jolivet, 2003).  
Casez and Tonin (2010) argue that the primary function of EPL is to 
ensure that workers have greater security, both in their current jobs and in the 
event of dismissal (Bevort and al., 2006). 
Many authors recognize that it is easier to quantitatively measure aspects 
such as the number of months' notice which must be met given before an 
individual or collective dismissal, while other aspects are more difficult to 
measure accurately, such as access to court procedures by dismissed employees, 
or the judicial interpretation of the legitimate reasons for terminating employment 
(Bertola and al. 2000). 
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Figure 1. Indicators of Employment Protection, 2013 
  
Source: Database of the OECD employment protection, 2013. 
Moreover, Blanchard and Tirole (2004) emphasize the principle of 
corporate responsibility on the social costs of layoffs. They argue that a “good 
system of employment protection” is one that financially empowers companies. 
Based on this financial responsibility, the decision whether to dismiss or not 
should be left to companies.  
3. Employment Protection and Labour Market Performance 
In addition, most theories of the labour market suggest that employment 
protection, in the form of legal and administrative constraints, should result in  
a lower rate of layoffs, reduced labour market flows, and longer durations of 
unemployment. According to the OECD, the empirical evidence on international 
data is largely consistent with these theoretical conclusions. On the basis of the 
indices of employment protection constructed, there is a strong negative correlation 
between employment protection and flow to and from employment and 
unemployment. Average times of high unemployment are often observed in 
those countries where employment protection is high (OECD 2004). 
In order to check this observation in the context of our comparison 
between France and Canada, we linked the level of employment protection and 
the harmonized unemployment rate. It is clear that it remains higher in France 
than in Canada (in 2013 10% against 7%). Certainly, the gap in unemployment 
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rates is partly explained by the difference in severity of the two countries’ EPL. 
However, in order to better validate such a conclusion, we are interested in long-
term unemployment (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Number of long-term unemployed (12 months and more) as a percentage of total 
unemployed 2007-2013 
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Source: database OECD 2013 workforce. 
In accordance with our intuition, we found that the number of long-term 
unemployed (12 months or more) is much higher in France. The latter has 
provoked, in recent years, long-term unemployment and a large drop in labour 
market participation. Although the unemployment benefit system remains more 
generous in France than in Canada, the current economic recession has made it 
impossible to maintain such a policy orientation. In this context, the French 
government has initiated a series of reforms to make its legislation less rigid and 
to give more flexibility to companies. 
In addition, to better understand the differences between the two countries in 
their responses to the rise in temporary jobs, we analyzed the proportion of 
permanent and temporary jobs, compared to total employment, in both economies. 
Several empirical studies have analyzed the effects of the severity of EPL 
on the performance of the labour market, and in particular on the level of 
employment and total unemployment (Autor and al. 2004, 2006, Kugler and 
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Saint-Paul 2004). However, these effects should be qualified by demographic 
groups to which EPL reforms apply. In this line, Behaghel and al. (2008), 
studied the effects of a less protective EPL reform on workers over 50 years of 
age in France. They showed that, after the reform, the unemployment rate for 
workers over 50 declined compared to their counterparts less than 50 years of 
age (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001, Fernandez-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 
2011). Other studies using time series data by industry have tried to analyze the 
correlation between EPL (including redundancy costs) and employment flows. 
In this sense, Bassanini and Garnero (2013) analyzed several sectors in a comparative 
approach of OECD countries. They show that the rate of transition from one job to 
another remains low in industries where EPL is restrictive (Haltiwanger and al. 2013). 
Figure 3. Evolution of the share of permanent and temporary jobs as a percentage of total 
employment 2002-2012 
Source: OECD Database: data expressed as a percentage of total employment. 
As shown in Figure 3, it appears that the share of permanent employment 
is higher in Canada than in France, while the finding is reversed when it comes 
to temporary employment. This result is not surprising and is entirely consistent 
with the characteristics of the two economies. Indeed, given that Canadian laws 
and regulations in terms of labour law are relatively flexible, companies can 
create permanent jobs more easily, as the costs of dismissal are less restrictive 
compared to other countries. In contrast, the rigid nature of the French labour 
market encourages companies to use temporary employment (fixed-term 
contracts) to meet their demand for labour and to circumvent the law with 
respect to permanent employment.  
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4. Final Remarks  
In this article we have tried to highlight some features of employment 
protection legislation (EPL) using a comparative approach between two different 
economies. We have shown that, according to OECD data, laws and regulations 
related to the labour market are more stringent in France than in Canada. This 
finding may partly explain the considerable gap between the two countries in the 
levels of long-term unemployment (France being much higher). Long term 
unemployment is one of the phenomena which is used to undermine the rigidity 
that characterizes the French labour market and justify the process of reforms to 
make France’s EPL more flexible. Despite these differences observed between  
a known rigid country such as France and one considered flexible such as 
Canada, many experts and organizations focus on international convergence in 
terms of public policies in the labour market (Amine 2014). This homogenization 
trend is largely justified by the consequences of the economic crisis, especially on 
fiscal responsibility for national budgets. 
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Streszczenie 
 
REFLEKSJE NA TEMAT USTAWODAWSTWA W ZAKRESIE OCHRONY 
ZATRUDNIENIA: PORÓWNANIE MIĘDZYNARODOWE 
 
W Europie, podobnie jak w pozostałych krajach uprzemysłowionych, reformy 
rynku pracy dotyczą na ogół ustawodawstwa w zakresie ochrony zatrudnienia (EPL). 
Jednym z głównych zadań tego ustawodawstwa jest zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa 
pracowników, w szczególności w przypadku zwolnienia z pracy. Celem niniejszego 
artykułu jest porównanie surowości i stopnia sztywności EPL dwóch różnych gospodarek, 
a mianowicie, Kanady i Francji. Wybór tych dwóch państw wynikał z faktu, że polityka 
rynku pracy w obu państwach jest odmiennie zorientowana i opiera się na różnych 
podstawach ideologicznych. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: ochrona zatrudnienia, Francja, Kanada, bezpieczeństwo, bezrobocie 
 
